Legitimacy (political)

In political science, legitimacy is the popular acceptance of a governing law or régime as an authority. Whereas “authority” denotes a specific position in an established government, the term “legitimacy” denotes a system of government — wherein “government” denotes “sphere of influence”. Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which, a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse. In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular régimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential élite.[1]

John Locke

The Enlightenment-era British social theoretician John Locke said that political legitimacy derives from popular explicit and implicit consent: “The argument of the [Second] Treatise is that the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed.”[2] The German political philosopher Dolf Sternberger said, “Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised, both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern, and with some recognition by the governed of that right.”[3] The American political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset said that legitimacy also “involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.”[4] The American political theorist Robert A. Dahl explained legitimacy as a reservoir; so long as the water is at a given level, political stability is maintained, if it falls below the required level, political legitimacy is endangered.[5]

In moral philosophy, the term “legitimacy” often is positively interpreted as the normative status conferred by a governed people upon their governors’ institutions, offices, and actions, based upon the belief that their government's actions are appropriate uses of power by a legally constituted government.

In law, “legitimacy” is distinguished from “legality” (see color of law), to establish that a government action can be legal whilst not being legitimate, e.g. a police search without proper warrant; conversely, a government action can be legitimate without being legal, e.g. a pre-emptive war, a military junta. An example of such matters arises when legitimate institutions clash in a constitutional crisis. Conceptually, “legitimacy” also applies to apolitical authorities, e,g, the Marxist philosophic and politico-economic challenge of capitalism as form of social organization, and government.

Contents

Types of legitimacy

Numinous legitimacy

Coat of arms of the Holy See
The divine king of Egypt: Horus as a falcon.

In a theocracy, government legitimacy derives from the spiritual authority of a god or a goddess.

Civil legitimacy

The political legitimacy of a civil government derives from agreement among the autonomous constituent institutions combined for the national common good; legitimate government office, as a public trust, is expressed via public elections.

Sources of legitimacy

Max Weber

The German economist and sociologist Max Weber identified three sources of political legitimacy.

Mattei Dogan

Moreover, like the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes, Weber thought that societies behave cyclically in governing themselves via different types of governmental legitimacy. Weber did not consider democracy necessary for legitimacy, because that condition could be established via codified law, custom, and principle, not via popular suffrage. He also observed that a society might decide to revert from legitimate government by rational–legal authority to charismatic government, e.g. Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini, and fascist Spain under General Francisco Franco.

The French political scientist Prof. Mattei Dogan presents a contemporary interpretation of Max Weber’s types of political legitimacy (traditional, charismatic, legal-rational) as insufficient to comprehend the complex relationships that constitute a legitimate political system in the twenty-first century.[6] Prof. Dogan said that two of the types (traditional authority and charismatic authority) are obsolete; the example being the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979), based upon the Koranic interpretations of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Dogan proposes that traditional authority has disappeared in the Middle East, that rule-proving exceptions being Islamic Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Prof. Dogan’s opinion, the third Weberian type of political legitimacy, rational–legal authority, in the contemporary world has so evolved that its permutations no longer allow it to be limited as a type of legitimate authority.

legitimate forms of government

Political legitimacy is an essentially contested concept, a philosophic construct by Walter Bryce Gallie (1912–98), presented to facilitate understanding of the different applications and interpretations of qualitative and evaluative concepts such as “Art”, “social justice”, et cetera, as used in aesthetics, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion.[7]

The term “essentially contested concepts” gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that dogmatism (“My answer is right, and all others are wrong”), scepticism (“All answers are equally true or [false], everyone has a right to his own truth”), and eclecticism (“Each meaning gives a partial view, so the more meanings the better”) are none of them the appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings.[8]
In the latter Weimar Republic (1918–33), Carl Schmitt, whose work as the “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich” promoted fascism and deconstructed liberal democracy, addressed the matter of political legitimacy in Legalitaet und Legitimitaet (Legality and Legitimacy, 1932) a treatise polemically asking that, if 51 per cent of parliamentary votes make for law and legality, then why do the remaining 49 of parliamentarians accept the majority’s decision?[11]

See also

References

  1. Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (pp. 124–188). New Haven (Connecticut) and London: Yale University Press, 1971
  2. Ashcraft, Richard (ed.): John Locke: Critical Assessments (p. 524). London: Routledge, 1991
  3. Sternberger, Dolf: "Legitimacy" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (ed. D.L. Sills) Vol. 9 (p. 244). New York: Macmillan, 1968
  4. Lipset, Seymour Martin: Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (2nd ed.) (p. 64). London: Heinemann, 1983
  5. Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (pp. 124–188). New Haven (Connecticut) and London: Yale University Press, 1971
  6. Dogan, Mattei: "Conceptions of Legitimacy" in Encyclopedia of Government and Politics (2nd ed.) (ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan) Vol. 2 (pp. 116-219). London: Routledge, 2003
  7. Initially published as Gallie (1956a), then as Gallie (1964).
  8. Garver (1978), p. 168.
  9. Charlton, Roger: Political Realities: Comparative Government (p. 23). London: Longman, 1986
  10. Charlton, Roger: Political Realities: Comparative Government (p. 23). London: Longman, 1986
  11. Schmitt, Carl: Legality and Legitimacy (Jeffrey Seitzer trans.). Durham (North Carolina): Duke University Press, 2004